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The present research examined the nature of prejudice toward people with 
developmental disabilities, its underlying root in dehumanization and implication for 
opposition to social policies, and the efficacy of two strategies for reducing this bias. In 
Study 1 and Study 2, dehumanization significantly predicted both greater prejudice and 
greater opposition to social policies benefitting people with Autism and Down 
Syndrome. Furthermore, prejudice significantly mediated the effect of dehumanization 
on social policy support. Dehumanization predicted greater prejudice, which led to less 
support for social policies. Building on the consistent association between 
dehumanization and prejudice in the first two studies, Study 3 examined whether either 
humanizing or individuating a person with Autism or Down Syndrome  would reduce 
prejudice and opposition to social policies toward the groups more broadly. Both 
humanizing and individuating a single person led to significant reductions in 
dehumanization of and prejudice toward the target group, relative to a control 
condition, and also increased support for social policies benefitting the group. A 
multiple mediation analysis suggested that these interventions reduced dehumanization, 
which reduced prejudice, and ultimately reduced opposition to social policies. This 
vii 
research illustrates the potential utility of humanization and individuation to reduce 










Stereotyping and prejudice research has traditionally focused on the nature of 
bias toward women and ethnic minorities, and bias toward other types of outgroups has 
been relatively understudied. For example, very little research has examined prejudice 
toward people with developmental disabilities1. Thus, prejudice toward people with 
developmental disabilities remains poorly understood, despite a long history of 
marginalization (e.g., institutionalization) and mistreatment (e.g., higher incidence of 
abuse and neglect than peers without disabilities; O’Brien, 1999; Braddock & Parish, 
2001; Gallagher, 2001; Denavas-Walt, Proctor, & Smith, 2013; Sullivan & Knutson, 
2000). To reduce bias toward people with developmental disabilities, the nature of bias 
toward this group and its antecedents should be examined.  
The primary goals of this research were to: (1) investigate the nature of 
prejudice toward people with developmental disabilities; (2) examine the extent to 
which this bias is rooted in dehumanization; (3) assess the consequences of this bias for 
social policy beliefs; and (4) investigate the efficacy of two strategies to reduce 
prejudice toward people with developmental disabilities.  
The Nature of Prejudice Toward People With Developmental Disabilities 
Although stereotyping and prejudice is a widely researched area in social 
psychology, prejudice toward people with developmental disabilities has received 
2 
relatively little attention in previous research. Indeed, little is known about how to 
conceptualize this type of prejudice, nor how to measure it. Werner, Corrigan, 
Ditchman, and Sokol (2012) reviewed and evaluated existing measures of stigma 
toward individuals with intellectual disabilities.2 They concluded that very few 
measures were theoretically grounded or assessed multiple dimensions of attitudes 
toward people with intellectual disabilities. In addition, several measures are overly 
broad (e.g., prejudice toward all people with disabilities), collapsing across a wide 
variety of disabilities that may differ across a number of dimensions (e.g., blindness, 
physical limitations, and intellectual disabilities). The present research contributes to 
the literature by developing a theoretically based, multi-dimensional scale to assess 
prejudice toward people with developmental disabilities.  
Prejudice is typically characterized by a negative evaluation or judgment of 
others based on their group membership. For instance, in his seminal book “The Nature 
of Prejudice,” Allport (1954) defined ethnic prejudice as “an antipathy based upon a 
faulty and inflexible generalization” (p. 9). Prejudiced attitudes toward many groups fit 
Allport’s (1954) definition neatly, with attitudes toward outgroups (e.g., old-fashioned 
racism toward African Americans) reflecting negative evaluations, a desire for social 
distance, and hostility (McConahay, 1986).  However, prejudiced attitudes may be 
more complex than mere disliking or antipathy. For example, according to Glick and 
Fiske (1996), sexism is characterized by ambivalent prejudice. Attitudes toward 
women not only reflect hostile attitudes (e.g., “Once a woman gets a man to commit to 
her, she usually tries to put him on a tight leash”) and negative evaluative judgments,  
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but also include more ostensibly favorable beliefs (e.g., “Many women have a quality 
of purity that few men possess”).  
These seemingly positive attitudes toward women are actually rooted in 
paternalistic beliefs. Benevolent sexism reflects a negative evaluation of women’s 
competence and ability to take part in broader society. These paternalistic beliefs 
maintain that women need to be protected, cared for, and submissive to men. They 
appear favorable toward women at face value. In fact, many women endorse 
benevolent sexist beliefs. However, these benevolent attitudes are a type of prejudice. 
Not only is benevolent sexism strongly and positively associated with hostile sexism, 
both sets of attitudes are based on and reinforce gender roles and assumptions about 
male dominance (Glick & Fiske, 1996). While benevolent sexism rewards women who 
fit into the socially appropriate gender roles, hostile sexism punishes women who fail 
to do so. Furthermore, both benevolent and hostile sexism paint women as reliant on or 
subordinate to men, justifying and reinforcing male dominance in society.  
Fiske and Stevens (1993) argue that this ambivalent prejudice is due to unique 
characteristics of gender. Unlike other targets of prejudice, women make up 
approximately 50% of the population. In addition, most people have close relationships 
with women, whereas interracial friendships and bonds are comparatively less 
common. Most importantly, the nature of gender and human reproduction dictates that 
men and women are mutually dependent upon one another to accomplish important life 
goals. Fiske and Stevens (1993) argue that closeness, paternalism, and mutual 
dependence provide the basis for the development of benevolent attitudes toward 
women.   
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Might prejudice toward people with developmental disabilities involve 
ambivalent attitudes? Like sexism, attitudes toward people with developmental 
disabilities may be similarly rooted in paternalistic beliefs. People with developmental 
disabilities often depend on others for some assistance to accomplish their goals and 
complete basic daily living tasks. Thus, paternalistic beliefs that people with 
developmental disabilities need to be protected and are dependent on others may be an 
important component of prejudice. Similar to ambivalent sexist beliefs, paternalistic 
beliefs about people with developmental disabilities may appear evaluatively positive, 
reflecting positive feelings toward the group. However, if prejudice toward people with 
developmental disabilities is ambivalent, then these paternalistic beliefs should be 
strongly, positively correlated with hostile beliefs.   
Supporting the possibility that prejudice toward people with developmental 
disabilities may be ambivalent, Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, and Xu (2002) found that 
“disabled people” were rated similarly to housewives on measures of warmth and 
competence. Both groups were seen as possessing high warmth, but lacking 
competence. According to the Stereotype Content Model (Fiske et al., 2002), prejudice 
toward groups who are high in warmth but low in competence is characterized by 
paternalistic beliefs. These groups tend to be low in social status and to evoke pity in 
others.  
However, another possibility is that prejudice toward people with 
developmental disabilities will be purely hostile.  Unlike women, people without 
developmental disabilities do not tend to have mutually dependent relationships with 
people with developmental disabilities. This is partially due to the smaller incidence of 
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people with developmental disabilities in society than women in society. In addition, 
the history of institutionalization and marginalization of people with developmental 
disabilities has traditionally set them apart from the rest of society. Consistent with this 
possibility, Fiske et al. (2002) found that participants rated the group “retarded people” 
as low on both warmth and competence. The stereotype content model predicts that 
prejudice toward groups that are low in both warmth and competence is characterized 
by hostile prejudice, and tends to evoke contempt and disgust in others.  
In sum, there are theoretical reasons to expect that prejudice toward people with 
developmental disabilities may be either purely hostile or may also include a 
benevolent component. The present research will determine which of these of these 
characterizations best fits the nature of people’s attitudes.  
Dehumanization: A Root of Prejudice Toward People With Developmental 
Disabilities? 
Depending on the nature of prejudice toward people with developmental 
disabilities, dehumanization may or may not be a root of bias. Broadly, dehumanization 
is the relative denial of mind, complex internal life, and overall humanness to an 
individual or group (Haslam, 2006; Leyens et al., 2000; Bogdan & Taylor, 1989). If 
prejudice toward people with developmental disabilities is ambivalent, dehumanization 
may not be strongly associated with bias. According to the stereotype content model, 
groups that are viewed as possessing high levels of warmth and of competence (e.g., 
housewives) are often the recipients of paternalistic prejudice (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & 
Xu, 2002). These groups tend to elicit feelings of pity, whereas groups that are more 
commonly dehumanized tend to elicit feelings of disgust. Furthermore, neuroimaging 
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evidence suggests that recipients of paternalistic prejudice are less likely to be 
dehumanized. Typically, person perception involves the activation of the medial pre-
frontal cortex (mPFC). For this reason, Harris and Fiske (2006) argued that lower 
activation of the mPFC when viewing an image of a person’s face is indicative of 
dehumanization. When participants viewed recipients of paternalistic prejudice (e.g., 
housewives) the mPFC showed the expected pattern of activation involved in person 
perception. These findings suggest that ambivalent prejudice is not associated with 
reduced activation of the mPFC. These findings suggest that dehumanization is not 
strongly linked to benevolent prejudice, but may be linked to more hostile forms of 
prejudice.  
If prejudice toward people with developmental disabilities takes a hostile rather 
than ambivalent form, it may well be rooted in dehumanization. The stereotype content 
model has established a link between low warmth/low competence stereotypes and 
dehumanization. For example, mentally ill or homeless people tend to be rated as 
lacking both warmth and competence (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002). In contrast 
with recipients of paternalistic prejudice, Harris and Fiske (2006) found that 
participants displayed lower mPFC activation when viewing the faces of people from 
these low competence/low warmth groups relative to ingroup members. Due to the role 
of the mPFC in person perception, these findings suggest that members of these groups 
may be so severely dehumanized that they are not even processed as human beings.  
Furthermore, dehumanization is an important antecedent of prejudice toward 
low-power groups. People in positions of low power in society tend to be 
dehumanized.  In two experiments conducted by Gwinn, Judd, and Park (2013), 
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participants were randomly assigned to a position of high or low power within a dyad. 
After an interaction, both participants rated their partner on a variety of traits, including 
traits that are viewed as unique to human beings (e.g., culture and morality; see 
Haslam, 2006). When compared to the low power participants, high power participants 
in both studies were more likely to dehumanize their partners by failing to attribute 
these uniquely human traits to their partners. In addition, low power groups in society 
tend to be targets of stigmatization. In fact, Link and Phelan (2001) argue that power 
discrepancies are an essential contributor to stigmatization. High power groups have 
the ability to define and enforce standards for society. Any person or group who fails to 
meet these standards can be stigmatized and labeled as deviant. Thus, outgroup 
members who occupy low power roles in society, such as people with developmental 
disabilities, may be vulnerable to dehumanization.  
Dehumanization is central to the concept of stigma. By its very definition, 
stigma conveys that an individual has a devalued or damaged identity (Bos, Pryor, 
Reeder, & Stutterheim, 2013). The stigmatizing “mark” or characteristic (e.g., ethnic 
group, illness, scarring, etc.) is socially devalued. People who are stigmatized are 
essentially viewed as possessing a “spoiled identity,” and thus less than fully human 
(Goffman, 1963; as cited in Bos, Pryor, Reeder, & Stutterheim, 2013). People with 
stigmatized identifies are derogated, tend to be avoided, and are often targets of 
discrimination (Bos, Pryor, Reeder, & Stutterheim, 2013).  
This potential link between dehumanization and prejudice toward people with 
developmental disabilities is important to address because dehumanized people are 
subject to a wide range of discrimination. In an archival analysis of news coverage of 
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death-eligible criminal cases from 1979-1999, Goff, Eberhardt, Williams, and Jackson 
(2008) found that Black defendants were more frequently described in newspaper 
articles with terms related to apes than White defendants. In addition, Black defendants 
who were later sentenced to death were described in the media with more ape-related 
words than Black defendants who were spared the death penalty (Goff et al., 2008). 
Furthermore, dehumanization predicts racial disparities in police treatment of children. 
Higher levels of implicit dehumanization of Blacks among police officers predicted 
greater use of force against Black children than non-Black children (Goff, Jackson, Di 
Leone, Culotta, & Di Tomasso, 2014).  
Finally, in a classic experimental study of the consequences of dehumanization, 
Bandura, Underwood, and Fromson (1975) found that outgroup members who were 
described in dehumanizing terms by an experimenter received harsher and more 
punitive treatment at the hands of participants than outgroup members described with 
neutral or humanizing language. In fact, outgroup members described in humanizing 
terms received the least severe and least punitive treatment of all three conditions 
(Bandura, Underwood, & Fromson, 1975). Thus, viewing people as less than human 
facilitated more severe treatment of these individuals, whereas humanizing others lead 
to more positive treatment.  These findings suggest that greater humanization could 
potentially reduce the negative effects of stigma and prejudice, contributing to more 
positive intergroup relations.   
Potential Implications for Social Policy Beliefs 
Although dehumanization and related prejudice have been strongly linked to 
interpersonal discrimination, their relation to social policy beliefs has received less 
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attention.  Public policies shape societal arrangements and conditions that are central to 
the well-being of stigmatized groups, ensuring equal treatment or lack thereof at the 
institutional and organizational levels. Thus, the present research examines the 
important relation between dehumanization, prejudice, and social policies beliefs in 
relation to people with developmental disabilities. 
Social policies can help combat inequality, can provide protection against 
discrimination, and can provide important community resources for stigmatized 
groups. For example, by creating socially protected classes, civil rights legislation and 
hate crime legislation aim to protect stigmatized groups against discrimination and 
harm. In addition, programs like Medicaid assistance provide support for people with 
developmental disabilities to achieve personally important goals. Social policies can 
increase the quality of life for targets of discrimination and prejudice.   
Prejudiced beliefs can undermine support for social policies benefitting targets 
of discrimination by legitimizing inequality. For example, hostile and benevolent sexist 
beliefs support and reinforce a social structure where women are dependent upon and 
subordinate to men (Glick & Fiske, 1996). By both rewarding women who 
appropriately fulfill their gendered role in society (benevolent sexist beliefs), and by 
punishing women who are seen as failing to fit into the appropriate gender role (hostile 
sexist beliefs), ambivalent sexism reinforces the social order. Thus, prejudiced belief 
systems help perpetuate and maintain the status quo.  
Beyond punitive treatment, people who are dehumanized often face barriers to 
accomplishing their goals. Due to their stigmatized identity, people with intellectual 
disabilities (including mental illness and other intellectual disabilities) encounter social 
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barriers to a wide variety of social outcomes, including their participation in their own 
community, access to employment opportunities, and access to housing opportunities 
(Werner, Corrigan, Ditchman, & Sokol, 2012). Thus their devalued identity constrains 
the ability of stigmatized individuals to pursue basic activities important to living an 
independent and meaningful life.  
Goals of the Present Research 
The present research is designed to test alternative theoretical models 
concerning the nature of prejudice toward people with developmental disabilities, the 
link between prejudice toward this group and dehumanization, and finally implications 
of dehumanization and prejudice toward people with developmental disabilities for 
social policy beliefs. Specifically, the first two studies examined the nature of prejudice 
and developed a novel, multidimensional scale assessing prejudice toward people with 
Autism and Down Syndrome. Autism and Down Syndrome are two of the most 
commonly diagnosed developmental disabilities. One in every 691 children born in the 
United States is diagnosed with Down Syndrome (“Facts about Down Syndrome,” 
2011), whereas, approximately 1 in 88 children have been diagnosed with an autism 
spectrum disorder (“Data & Statistics,” 2013).  
In the first two studies both a hostile model of prejudice and an ambivalent 
model of prejudice were examined using confirmatory factor analysis to determine 
which model provided the best fit to the data. In addition, these studies examined 
whether prejudice toward people with Autism and Down Syndrome was associated 
with dehumanization. Finally, these studies examined the consequences of prejudice 
and dehumanization for social policy beliefs.  
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 The third study reported herein examines the possibility that prejudice toward 
people with developmental disabilities, and in turn opposition to social policies, can be 
reduced by encouraging humanization. If prejudice toward people with developmental 
disabilities is hostile and rooted in dehumanization, then viewing people with 
developmental disabilities as possessing humanized traits and characteristics should 
reduce dehumanization, reduce prejudice, and ultimately boost support for beneficial 
social policies.  
However, it is also possible that individuation, viewing people with 
developmental disabilities as individuals, will promote humanization of people with 
developmental disabilities. Individuation and person-first language strategies 
emphasize the personhood of people with developmental disabilities, and are widely 
used in fields that serve people with disabilities (Hadley & Brodwin, 1988; Blaska, 
1993; APA, 2010).  Person-first language removes the emphasis from the disability as 
a primary characteristic of the person (e.g., disabled person vs. person with 
disabilities). Efforts to individuate people with disabilities emphasize the unique 
capabilities and interests of the individual when planning care programs and services to 
assist them. Furthermore, these initiatives emphasize always referring to people with 
disabilities by their name, as opposed to the more dehumanizing language of “the 
patient” or “the client.” In applied settings, these strategies are used in part to reduce 
biased language, while increasing focus on the individual (Blaska, 1993).  
Previous research suggests that individuating information can reduce or 
eliminate the biasing effect of social stereotypes on social judgments (Locksley, 
Hepburn, & Ortiz, 1982). Locksley and colleagues (1982) gave participants 
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information about male and female targets, and then asked them to make judgments 
about the likelihood that a target would engage in a behavior in the future. When 
participants were given individuating information, gender stereotypes did not influence 
their judgments. However, when this information was not given or when this 
information was not related to the behavior being predicted, gender stereotypes did 
influence participant’s judgments. By focusing attention on a single person’s individual 
activities, relationships, and preferences, individuating information about a person with 
a developmental disability may reduce the effect of pre-existing stereotypes and beliefs 
on judgments of the humanness of people with developmental disabilities more 
broadly. If effective, the individuation manipulation would suggest that people with 
developmental disabilities can be humanized even if they are seen as possessing 











Study 1 had two primary goals. The first goal was to develop a 
multidimensional measure of prejudice toward people with developmental disabilities. 
Second, Study 1 examined the nature of prejudice toward people with Autism and 
Down Syndrome.  
One possibility was that prejudice toward people with developmental 
disabilities would be ambivalent, containing both hostile and benevolent components. 
Hostile bias is often measured with elements of stereotypes such as harm and 
separation. For example, old-fashioned racism includes beliefs that Black people are 
aggressive or dangerous and the desire to maintain social distance from Black people 
(McConahay, 1986). Furthermore, these two dimensions of stereotypes are salient 
aspects of negative beliefs about people with developmental disabilities (O’Brien, 
1999).  Thus, the hostile component of prejudice toward people with Autism and Down 
Syndrome was assessed with items reflecting beliefs that people with developmental 
disabilities are dangerous and beliefs that people with developmental disabilities 
should be kept apart from the rest of society. Following Glick and Fiske (1996), 
benevolent bias toward people with disabilities assessed dependence and idealization. 
In the ambivalent sexism inventory, these dimensions reflected paternalistic attitudes 
that women possess special, idealized qualities (e.g., “Women, compared to men, tend 
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to have a more refined sense of culture and good taste.”) and are dependent on men 
(Glick & Fiske, 1996). Furthermore, these paternalistic beliefs may similarly apply to 
people with developmental disabilities, due to socially salient stereotypes of people 
with developmental disabilities as dependent on others, or even heroic for overcoming 
obstacles (“Attitudinal barriers for people with disabilities,” 2015). As in Glick and 
Fiske (1996), if attitudes toward people with developmental disabilities are ambivalent, 
idealization and dependence should be strongly and positively associated with one 
another. Furthermore, hostile and benevolent prejudice should be positively correlated 
if bias toward people with developmental disabilities is ambivalent.  
A second possibility was that prejudice toward people with developmental 
disabilities would be hostile. In this model, hostile prejudice would still be composed 
of the dimensions of harm and separation. However, unlike the ambivalent model, 
dependence would be evaluatively negative. That is, the belief that people with 
developmental disabilities rely on others for meeting their daily needs would be 
infused with negative evaluation. This association between hostile prejudice and 
perceptions of low status outgroup members as dependent is consistent with attitudes 
toward low competence/low warmth outgroups (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002). For 
example, welfare recipients are viewed as freeloaders in society and are targets of 
hostile bias. Therefore, if bias toward people with developmental disabilities is hostile, 
dependence should correlate positively with harm and separation. Idealization would 
not be part of this hostile form of prejudice.  
In addition, this study examined the novel link between dehumanization and 
support for social policies that benefit targets of prejudice. Greater dehumanization of 
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people with developmental disabilities was expected to be associated with greater 
prejudice toward people with developmental disabilities (Hypothesis 1a) and with less 
support for beneficial social policies (Hypothesis 1b). Furthermore, prejudice was 
expected to mediate the association between dehumanization and social policy support 
(Hypothesis 2).  
Method 
Participants  
One hundred and ninety-six participants (121 men, Mage = 19.81 years, SDage = 
1.37 years) were recruited from the Introductory Psychology participant pool at Purdue 
University. Participants completed the study online using the survey hosting service, 
Qualtrics and received one research credit in return.  
Procedure 
After consenting to participate in the study, participants were randomly 
assigned to respond to questions about people with Autism or people with Down 
Syndrome throughout the study. First, participants completed a short demographics 
questionnaire. Next, participants completed the study questionnaires. 
Participants completed a commonly used measure of dehumanization 
(Appendix C; Haslam, 2006). Participants indicated the extent to which they believed 
10 uniquely human and 10 human nature traits are typical of either people with Autism 
or people with Down Syndrome (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). 
Following the dehumanization measure, participants completed our 19-item 
measure of prejudice (Appendix D). This measure included items designed to tap into 
hostile and benevolent prejudice. Hostile items reflected beliefs that people with 
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Autism and Down Syndrome are dangerous and a threat to others (i.e., the Harm 
subscale), and the desire for social distance from people with Autism and Down 
Syndrome (i.e., the Separation subscale). Items tapping into Benevolent prejudice were 
adapted from the Benevolent Sexism subscale of the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory 
(Glick & Fiske, 1996). These items were designed to capture paternalistic beliefs about 
people with Autism and Down Syndrome. Items on the Dependence subscale were 
written to capture the belief that people with Autism and Down Syndrome are 
dependent on others to accomplish their goals and complete daily living tasks. Items on 
the Idealization subscale were written to capture more complimentary, but also role 
restrictive, beliefs about people with Autism and Down Syndrome (e.g., “People with 
[either Autism or Down Syndrome] are sweeter and happier than people without 
disabilities”). Participants indicated their agreement on a scale from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).  
Respondents rated their agreement with 14 items assessing support for social 
policies that benefit or affirm the agency or value of people with either Autism or 
Down Syndrome (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree; Appendix E). These items 
were developed to assess support for a variety of social policies including special 
education funding, financial assistance programs, equal payment, and individual 
liberties. The scale focuses on these social policies because they reflect a wide variety 
of programs and policies that have the potential to improve distinct domains of life for 
people with developmental disabilities. For example, special education funding 
provides access to public education, while laws safeguarding individual liberties 
provide protection against discrimination.  
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Finally, we asked participants to indicate whether they had any close family 
members with either Autism or Down Syndrome.  
Results 
Item Analysis 
I first examined descriptive statistics for the prejudice scale items. Means, 
standard deviations, skewness values, and kurtosis values for each of the indicators on 
the prejudice scale may be found in Table 1. One item was quite skewed, indicating 
that it was not normally distributed. The item, “People with [either Autism or Down 
Syndrome] should be welcome to participate in community events” had a skew value 
of -1.41.  
 Next, I calculated correlations between each of the scale indicators (Table 2). 
Correlations at or above .30 between items on the same factor indicate that the items 
have sufficient shared variance. However, very high correlations between items (e.g., r 
= .90) suggest a problem of extreme collinearity. Thus, moderately large correlations 
between items are the most desirable (Kline, 2011). The items on the harm factor were 
nicely correlated with each other (r range = .43 - .70). The items on the separate factor 
were less consistently correlated with one another (r range = -.12 - .34), with most of 
the correlations falling below .30. However, the items on the dependent factor were 
strongly related to one another. Correlations ranged from .24 - .61, with the majority of 
correlations falling above .40. One item, “people with [either Autism or Down 
Syndrome] need to be protected because they are easily exploited,” was less strongly 
correlated with the other dependence items than any of the other items. The four 
idealization items were also nicely interrelated (r range = .28 - .59). 
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In addition, I looked for strong correlations between items on different 
subscales. Interestingly, the items on the dependence subscale were strongly and 
positively related to items on the harm subscale. This suggests that these two subscales 
may be very closely related to one another. Although we anticipated a strong 
association between dependent and idealization items in the case of benevolent bias, 
the items on these two subscales were only weakly correlated with one another. Taken 
together, this suggests that items on the Dependent and Idealization subscales are not 
tapping into the same construct. We would expect the Dependent and Idealization 
subscales to be strongly and positively related if they were both tapping into a 
benevolent form of prejudice. Indeed, the close association between dependence and 
harm supports a hostile, rather than ambivalent model of prejudice.   
Following these analyses, one item was removed from the prejudice scale. The 
item, “people with [either Autism or Down Syndrome] should be welcome to 
participate in community events,” was skewed, kurtotic, and did not correlate strongly 
with the other items on the separate subscale.  
Confirmatory Factor Analyses 
Confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) were performed to examine the nature of 
prejudice toward people with developmental disabilities using the statistical package 
Mplus (Version 6.0, Muth ́en & Muth́en, 2008-2010). The items on the prejudice scale 
were relatively normally distributed (Table 1). Thus, the CFAs were conducted using 
maximum likelihood estimation. Few participants were missing responses for 
individual scale indicators (mean per item = 0.09 %, range = 0% - .3%). These data 
were missing completely at random due to a computer error. I used full information 
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maximum likelihood (FIML) modeling of missing data. This method for dealing with 
missing data is the default option for missing data when using maximum likelihood 
robust estimation in Mplus version 6.0 (Muth́en & Muth́en, 2008-2010). When data are 
missing completely at random, FIML provides consistent parameter estimates (Brown, 
2006).  
 The goodness of fit of the two confirmatory factor analysis models were 
evaluated with the chi-square test, the comparative fit index (CFI), the Tucker-Lewis 
index (TLI), the root-mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA), the standard root 
mean square residual (SRMR), and the akaike information criterion (AIC). I adopted 
the following standards suggested by Hu & Bentler (1999) in order to evaluate the fit 
of the two confirmatory factor models: a non-significant chi-square test, CFI value 
close to .95, TLI close to .95, RMSEA close to .08, and a SRMR value close to .06. 
However, the chi-square test for model fit often is significant. Thus, greater emphasis 
is on a model with the smallest chi-square value and the other indices. In addition, AIC 
values for each model were examined. When comparing models, a smaller AIC value 
suggests a better fit to the data. Values approaching these standards on multiple fit 
statistics will suggest a good fit between the tested model and the data.    
The ambivalent prejudice model included all four theorized components of the 
prejudice scale: Harm, Separation, Dependence, and Idealization (Figure 1). The 
hostile prejudice model included three of the theorized factors: Harm, Separation, and 
Dependence (Figure 2). In the hostile model, dependence was conceptualized as a 
component of hostile bias. Instead of reflecting more positive, paternalistic beliefs 
about people with developmental disabilities, dependence is conceptualized as 
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reflecting evaluatively negative beliefs about people with developmental disabilities in 
the hostile model of prejudice. The fit statistics for these models are reported in Table 
3. In the ambivalent prejudice model, harm and separation were expected to tap into 
hostile bias, whereas dependence and idealization were expected to tap into benevolent 
prejudice. Finally, hostile and benevolent prejudice were expected to correlate 
positively. According to the model fit statistics, the ambivalent model of prejudice was 
a good fit to the data. Although the chi-square test was significant, the CFI and TLI 
values fell at or near the standard values of .95. In addition, RMSEA was at the 
standard value of .05.  
Next, I looked at the factor loadings for all of the scale indicators. All 19 
indicators loaded significantly onto their respective subscales of prejudice. In addition, 
both the harm and separation prejudice subscales loaded significantly onto the latent 
variable for hostile prejudice. However, only dependence loaded significantly and 
positively onto the benevolent prejudice latent factor. The idealization subscale had a 
small, negative relationship with benevolent prejudice, suggesting that it was not as 
highly related to the dependence subscale as anticipated. Although this model was a 
good fit for the data, the low, negative association between the idealization subscale 
and the superordinate factor of benevolent prejudice does not support a benevolent 
model of prejudice. Instead of the expected strong and positive association between 
idealization and dependence, we see that the two subscales are negatively related.  
In the hostile bias model, the harm, separation and dependence subscales were 
expected to tap into hostile bias. The fit statistics suggest that this model is an excellent 
fit for the data (see Table 3). In addition, the hostile model was a significantly better fit 
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for the data than the benevolent model of bias, Δχ2 (40) = 80.34, p < .001. Although the 
chi-square test was significant, CFI and TLI fell above .95, RMSEA fell below .05, and 
SRMR was below the standard of .06. In addition, the AIC for the hostile model was 
much smaller than the AIC for the ambivalent model, indicating significantly better fit. 
Furthermore, the factor loadings for each of the subscales onto the hostile prejudice 
latent factor were positive and significant. Thus, the hostile mode of prejudice provided 
a better fit for the data. 
Finally, I examined a MIMIC model to examine whether mean levels of 
prejudice differed in the Down Syndrome versus the Autism condition. The fit statistics 
suggest that the model is an excellent fit for the data (Table 3). Furthermore, the path 
between condition and the latent variable for prejudice is significant, B = .50, SE = .18, 
p < .006, suggesting that participants reported greater prejudice toward people with 
Down Syndrome than people with Autism.     
Dehumanization, Prejudice, and Social Policy Beliefs 
 Scores for the prejudice, dehumanization, and social policy scales were 
computed by averaging relevant item ratings. Descriptive statistics (e.g., means, 
standard deviations, reliabilities, and correlations) for these scales are reported in Table 
4. All three scales had acceptable reliabilities.  
 In line with predictions, the greater the dehumanization, the greater the 
prejudice participants reported toward people with Autism and Down Syndrome, 
r(196) = .55, p < .001. Furthermore, as both dehumanization and prejudice increased, 
support for social policies benefitting people with developmental disabilities decreased, 
rs(196) = -.46 and - .50, respectively, ps < .001.  
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 The hypothesized mediation model was tested using Hayes’s (2014) PROCESS 
macro for SPSS (Model 4, 5000 bootstraps). The relationship between dehumanization 
and social policy beliefs was mediated by prejudice (Figure 3), as indicated by a 
significant indirect effect, CI [-.39, -.14]. As anticipated, greater dehumanization was 
related to higher levels of prejudice, which in turn was associated with decreased 
support for social policies.  
An alternate mediation model was tested to examine whether dehumanization 
mediated the association between prejudice and social policy beliefs. The relationship 
between prejudice and social policy beliefs was significantly mediated by 
dehumanization (Figure 4), as indicated by a significant indirect effect, CI [-.23, -.05].  
 A moderated mediation model was examined to test whether the prejudice 
mediated the association between dehumanization and social policy support for both 
people with Autism and people with Down Syndrome. Specifically, I conducted a 
mediation analyses using group (i.e. Autism and Down Syndrome) as a moderator 
(PROCESS model 59, Hayes, 2013). The indirect effect of dehumanization on social 
policy was significant for Autism, CI [-.61, -.20]. Dehumanization predicted greater 
prejudice toward people with Autism. Greater prejudice in turn predicted less support 
for social policies. The indirect effect of dehumanization on social policy was not 
significant for Down Syndrome, CI [-.38, .05]. However, the direct effects were 
consistent with the proposed model. Dehumanization was associated with higher levels 
of prejudice toward people with Down Syndrome, and prejudice was associated with 
reduced support for beneficial policies.  
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Comparisons Involving Type of Disability 
 Independent samples t-tests were performed to assess whether people with 
Autism and people with Down Syndrome were rated differently on prejudice, 
dehumanization, and social policy. People reported significantly greater prejudice 
toward people with Down Syndrome (M = 3.82, SD = .96) than people with Autism (M 
= 3.50, SD = 1.03) t(194) = -2.031, p < .03, d = .32. The two groups did not differ on 
dehumanization, t(193) = 1.49, p > .13, or social policy t(194) = .20, p > .83. 
Discussion 
 Study 1 provided preliminary validation for the measure of prejudice toward 
people with Autism and Down Syndrome. Although both the ambivalent and hostile 
models of prejudice proved a good fit for the data, the hostile model of prejudice 
provided a significantly better fit. In addition, the idealization subscale only had a 
small, negative factor loading on to benevolent prejudice, while harm and dependence 
items were strongly correlated with one another. Thus, the results of Study 1 suggest 
that the nature of prejudice toward people with developmental disabilities is hostile 
rather than ambivalent.  In addition, Study 1 examined the prediction that the effect of 
prejudice on social policy beliefs would be mediated by participant prejudice. Both the 
predicted model and the alternate model were supported. Replication of these findings 
in a separate sample of participants will lend strength to these conclusions, which was 











 Study 2 had two primary goals. First, I sought to confirm the hostile structure of 
the prejudice measure from Study 1 as superior to the ambivalent structure in a separate 
sample. Doing so also provided the opportunity to modify some items to strengthen the 
prejudice measure (i.e., rephrasing a double-barreled question and adding some 
reverse-score items).  
 A second goal of Study 2 was to replicate the model of the mediating effect of 
prejudice in the relation between dehumanization and social policy. As in Study 1, I 
expected that dehumanization would be associated with greater prejudice toward 
people with developmental disabilities (Hypothesis 1a), that dehumanization would be 
associated with lower levels of support for social policies (Hypothesis 1b), and that 
prejudice would predict lower levels of support for social policies (Hypothesis 1c). 
Finally, I expected that prejudice would mediate the association between 
dehumanization and social policy beliefs (Hypothesis 2).  
Method 
Participants  
Three hundred and twelve participants were recruited from Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk, and completed the study on the online survey platform Qualtrics.  
Ten participants completed the survey twice. Their second completion data was 
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deleted. Six participants failed to follow directions and were removed from the dataset. 
After removing these participants, 296 participants (123 men, Mage = 37.53 years old, 
SDage = 13.93 years) remained in the dataset. All participants received 40 cents in 
return for their participation in the study.  
Procedure 
As in Study 1, all participants were randomly assigned to respond in relation to 
either Autism or Down Syndrome. After consenting to participate in the study, all 
participants completed the study questionnaires. First, participants completed a short 
demographics questionnaire. 
Next, participants completed the measure of dehumanization. They rated the 
extent to which they believed that 10 uniquely human and 10 human nature traits 
(Appendix C; Haslam, 2006) are typical of either people with Autism or people with 
Down Syndrome (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). 
Following the dehumanization measure, participants completed an updated 18 
item measure of prejudice (see Appendix F for information on how items were 
changed). Several items on the prejudice scale were updated following Study 1. Several 
items were altered to eliminate “double-barreling.” For example, the item “People with 
[either Autism or Down Syndrome] are impulsive and unpredictable, and should be 
closely watched,” was changed to “People with [either Autism or Down Syndrome] are 
impulsive and unpredictable.” In addition, I reverse scored items were added to the 
Harm subscale (e.g., “People with [either Autism or Down Syndrome] are harmless”). 
Finally, items were added to the separate subscale (e.g., “I prefer not to interact with 
people who have [either Autism or Down Syndrome]”). Participant indicated their 
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agreement with 18 items assessing prejudice toward people with Autism or people with 
Down Syndrome (1= strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) 
Respondents rated their agreement with 13 items assessing support for social 
policies that benefit or affirm the agency or value of people with either Autism or 
Down Syndrome (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree; Appendix E). 
Finally, participants indicated whether they had any close family members with 
either Autism or Down Syndrome.  
Results 
Item Selection 
Descriptive statistics and correlations for each of the items on the prejudice 
scale are shown in Table 5. The item, “I feel some disgust when looking at people with 
[either Autism or Down Syndrome],” was quite skewed and kurtotic. This item was 
removed. All other items were relatively normally distributed.  
 Correlations between the indicators for the prejudice scale are shown in Table 
6. The item, “People with [either Autism or Down Syndrome] are easily exploited,” did 
not correlate well with other items on the dependence subscale (rs < .22). In addition, 
the item, “People with [either Autism or Down Syndrome] overcome many hardships,” 
had only a small correlation with items on the idealization subscale (rs = .22, .23, and 
.40, respectively, p < .05), suggesting that this item was not tapping into the same 
construct as the idealization subscale.  Furthermore, when these items are included in 
CFA, they do not load onto their respective subscales above .40. These two items were 
removed from the prejudice scale due to their low correlations with other items.  
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As in Study 1, items on the idealization and dependence subscales were weakly 
and even negatively correlated with one another. These weak associations demonstrate 
that these two subscales are not closely related. In addition, these correlations suggest 
that prejudice toward people with developmental disabilities is not ambivalent.  
Confirmatory Factor Analyses 
Mplus (Version 6.0, Muth ́en & Muth́en, 2008-2010) was used to perform CFA 
analyses for examining whether the prejudice scale is tapping ambivalent or hostile 
attitudes toward people with developmental disabilities.  Items on the prejudice scale 
were relatively normally distributed [skew < 1.0; kurtosis < 1.2], so maximum 
likelihood estimation was used.. Few participants were missing responses for 
individual scale indicators (mean per item < 0.7 %, range = 0.67% - 1.01%). These 
data were missing completely at random due to a computer error, so FIML was used, 
which is the default method for dealing with missing data in MPLUS version 6.0 
(Muth́en & Muth́en, 2008-2010).  
Goodness of fit of the models was evaluated in the same was as in Study 1. 
Four separate models were run. The ambivalent prejudice model included all four 
theorized components of the prejudice scale: harm, separation, dependence, and 
idealization (Figure 5). Harm and separation loaded onto hostile prejudice in the 
ambivalent model, whereas dependence and idealization loaded onto benevolent 
prejudice.  Hostile and benevolent prejudice were then free to covary with one another 
in the model. The hostile prejudice model included three of the theorized factors: harm, 
separation, and dependence (Figure 6). These factors loaded onto a latent factor of 
hostile prejudice.  
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The fit statistics for these models are reported in Table 7. The ambivalent 
model was a poor fit for the data. The chi-square test was significant, CFI and TLI fell 
well below the standard of .95, and SRMR was above the standard of .06. Only 
RMSEA fell near Hu and Bentler’s (1999) recommended value of equal to or less than 
.08. Overall, these values suggest some misfit between the ambivalent model of 
prejudice and the data.  
The model of hostile was a significantly better fit for the data (Δχ2 (40) = 
168.47, p < .001). Modification indices for this model suggested that three correlated 
disturbances be added to the model, so correlations were added between the following 
pairs of indicator disturbances: Separation items endorsing the need for separate 
housing and the need for people with developmental disabilities to spend time apart 
from people without disabilities; Separation items endorsing the desire to avoid 
interactions with people with disabilities and feelings of discomfort when near people 
with developmental disabilities; and finally between the Dependence items endorsing 
that people with developmental disabilities need to be cared for and need to be 
protected. Looking at the individual factors, these pairs of items are more closely 
related to one another conceptually than they are to the other items on the same 
subscale. These disturbances are correlated in all subsequent analyses. With the 
correlated disturbances, the fit statistics suggest that this model is an acceptable fit to 
the data. Although the chi-square test was significant, this model was a significantly 
better fit for the data than the hostile prejudice model without correlated disturbances 
(Δχ2 (2) = 114.7, p < .01). CFI and TLI fell below the .95 standard of good fit but 
above.90, suggesting acceptable fit (Brown, 2006). Furthermore RMSEA fell below 
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.08, SRMR was below the standard of .06, and the CFI value was .92. In addition, this 
model has the lowest AIC of all models examined. Finally, the factor loadings for all of 
the indicators were significant in this model.  
Dehumanization, Prejudice, and Social Policy Beliefs 
 Descriptive statistics (e.g., means, standard deviations, reliabilities, and 
correlations) for each of the scales completed in this study are listed in Table 8. All 
scales had acceptable scale reliabilities.  
 As in Study 1, the greater the dehumanization, the greater prejudice was 
reported toward people with Autism and Down Syndrome, r(296) = .60, p < .001. In 
addition, as both dehumanization and prejudice increased, support for social policies 
decreased, rs(296) = -.36 and -.59, respectively, ps < .001.  
 A mediation analysis using Hayes’s (2014) PROCESS for SPSS (Model 4, 
5000 bootstraps) was used to test the proposed model. As in Study 1, prejudice 
significantly mediated the relationship between dehumanization and social policy 
support (Figure 7). The indirect effect was significant, CI [-.55, -.28]. Dehumanization 
predicted greater prejudice toward people with either Autism or Down Syndrome. 
Prejudice in turn was associated with decreased support for social policies.  
As in study 1, an alternate mediation model was tested to examine whether 
dehumanization mediated the association between prejudice and social policy beliefs. 
The relationship between prejudice and social policy beliefs was not significantly 
mediated by dehumanization (Figure 8), as indicated by a significant indirect effect, CI 
[-.07, .07].  
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 As in Study 1, a moderated mediation model was examined to test whether the 
prejudice mediated the association between dehumanization and social policy support 
for both people with Autism and people with Down Syndrome. Specifically, I 
conducted a mediation analyses using group (i.e. Autism and Down Syndrome) as a 
moderator (PROCESS model 59, Hayes, 2013). Unlike Study 1, prejudice significantly 
mediated the effects of dehumanization on social policy support for both people with 
Autism, CI [-.58, -.27] and people with Down Syndrome, CI [-.69, .21]. 
Dehumanization predicted greater prejudice toward people with Autism and Down 
Syndrome. In turn, greater prejudice predicted less support for beneficial policies. 
Comparisons Involving Type of Disability 
 Independent samples t-tests were performed to assess whether people with 
Autism and people with Down Syndrome were rated differently on dehumanization, 
prejudice, and social policy. People reported greater dehumanization of people with 
Autism (M = 4.04, SD = .81) than people with Down Syndrome (M = 3.47, SD = .69), 
t(293) = 6.01, p < .001, d = .76. Prejudice, t(289) = 1.78, p > .07, and support for social 
policies, t(289) = .89, p = .37, did not differ between the two conditions. 
Discussion 
 This study provided additional support for a purely hostile model of prejudice. 
The CFA indicated that the hostile model of prejudice was a significantly better fit for 
the data than the ambivalent model of prejudice. Furthermore, the hostile model of 
prejudice had an adequate level of fit according to the recommendations of Hu and 
Bentler (1999). This support for the hostile model of prejudice suggests that people 
prefer that people with developmental disabilities be kept away from mainstream 
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society because they are seen as dangerous people who are dependent on rather than 
contributing to society.  
 Furthermore, consistent with a hostile prejudice model, prejudice toward people 
with developmental disabilities was strongly associated with dehumanization. 
Additionally, prejudice mediated the effect of dehumanization on social policy. Taken 
together, the data from Study 1 and Study 2 support a hostile model of prejudice 











Study 3 investigated the efficacy of strategies to reduce bias toward people with 
developmental disabilities. If this form of prejudice is hostile and closely linked to 
dehumanization, then an intervention designed to humanize people with developmental 
disabilities should result in a significant reduction of dehumanization (Hypothesis 1), a 
reduction in prejudice (Hypothesis 2), and an increase in support for beneficial social 
policies (Hypothesis 3). Furthermore, the increase in support for social policies due to 
the intervention should be mediated by respective decreases in dehumanization and 
prejudice (Hypothesis 4).  
In addition, I sought to examine the efficacy of an alternative prejudice reduction 
strategy, individuation. Focusing on the individual and his/her specific goals and 
abilities, as opposed to the disability, has long been championed in fields that serve 
people with disabilities. Person-centered language is viewed as a method for reducing 
the casual depersonalization of clinical, disability focused language. Study 3 examined 
whether mere individuation is sufficient to reduce dehumanization, reduce prejudice, 
and boost support for social policies benefitting people with developmental disabilities 
(Hypotheses 5-7).  
Finally, Study 3 investigated the implications of these strategies beyond the 
reduction of prejudiced attitudes and opposition to beneficial social policies. I assessed 
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whether individuation and/or humanization might boost participants’ willingness to 
engage in action for social change benefitting people with developmental disabilities.  
Method 
Participants 
One hundred and fifty-six participants (90 men, 66 women, Mage =19.79 years 
old, SDage = 1.49 years) were recruited from the Introductory Psychology participant 
pool at Purdue University and received research credit for participating.  
Design 
A 2 group (Autism vs. Down Syndrome) x 3 framing condition (Neutral, 
Individuated, vs. Humanized) between-participants design was used.  
Procedure 
Participants arrived at the lab in groups of up to six people.  Participants signed 
informed consent forms (Appendix G). Each participant sat in front of an individual 
computer station. Participants were randomly assigned to both framing condition and 
group condition.  
At the beginning of the session, the experimenter explained that the study 
investigated the kinds of attitudes that people had toward other groups of people. 
Participants were told that they would read a description of a typical person with either 
Autism or Down Syndrome. They were further informed that the description was 
written by the target person’s mother. Participants in the humanized condition read a 
description of Tim that included information about his experience of secondary 
emotions (e.g., jealousy), goals (e.g., to get a job), and reciprocal relationships (e.g., his 
mutually beneficial relationship with his brother; Appendix H). In contrast, participants 
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in the individuated condition read a description that included information about Tim’s 
emotions, future plans, and relationships but without humanizing traits. Thus, Tim 
experienced primary emotions (e.g., anger), other-directed goals (e.g., his mother wants 
him to get a job), and more one-sided relationships (e.g., his brother tries to pull him 
out of his shell). In the neutral condition, participants read the same description of Tim 
with the humanizing and individuating traits removed.  
After reading the description of Tim, all participants completed the 
dehumanization scale (Haslam, 2006; Appendix C). Also included were 
dehumanization items assessing beliefs about whether people with Down Syndrome 
and Autism participate in reciprocal social relationships and have a place in society 
(adapted from Bogdan & Taylor, 1989). Participants rated the dehumanization items on 
a response scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). Items were scored such that 
higher values indicated greater levels of overall dehumanization.  
Next, participants completed the 18-item measure of prejudice that was 
developed in the Studies 1 and 2 (Appendix F). Participants rated their agreement with 
each item on a response scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). Items were scored 
such that higher values indicated greater prejudice. 
Participants were asked to rate their agreement with the 13-item questionnaire 
assessing social policy beliefs on 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) scales 
(Appendix E). Items were scored such that higher values indicated greater levels of 
support for social policies that lead to greater social inclusion and self-determination of 
people with developmental disabilities.  
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Participants also completed a measure of Social Dominance Orientation (Pratto, 
Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994; Appendix I). Social Dominance Orientation was 
assessed as a potential covariate of support for social policies. Because Social 
Dominance Orientation reflects a preference for social inequality, I expect that it would 
be negatively correlated with support for social policies, regardless of framing 
condition. Participants rated their reactions to 16 statements from 1 (very negative) to 7 
(very positive). A sample item is, “Sometimes other groups must be kept in their 
place.” Responses were scored such that higher values indicate greater support for 
group-based social inequality.  
To examine construct validity for the prejudice scale, participants responded to 
five semantic differential items (e.g. Bad-Good; Appendix J) on a 1 to 6 response 
scales. Items were scored such that lower values reflect more negative evaluations.  
Then the experimenter told participants that they had completed the experiment. 
The experimenter explained that a local chapter of a national non-profit organization 
asked the researchers to distribute a questionnaire to participants in our study. The 
experimenter emphasized that this questionnaire was not related to the study and was 
completely optional. The experimenter then directed participants to the link to the 
organization’s questionnaire and stepped out of the room for a few minutes while 
participants reviewed a petition supporting minimum wage protection for people with 
developmental disabilities and completed relevant items (Appendix K). I created an 
index of petition support by averaging responses to the questions, “How interested are 
you in being contacted by this organization in the coming months about opportunities 
to get involved in similar causes?” and “How willing would you be to volunteer time in 
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a local chapter office of the American Association of People with Disabilities over the 
next three months?,” r(156) = .74, p < .001. The item “Please indicate how favorable 
you feel toward this petition,” was not included in the index because it did not correlate 
well with the other items, rs < .20. This lack of association with the other petition items 
appears to be due to a ceiling effect on this item, M = 5.99, SD = 1.48.  
After the petition, participants completed demographic measures, including 
ratings of previous contact with people with Down Syndrome or Autism (Appendix L). 
Participants rated how much previous contact they have had, the nature of their 
relationships (if applicable) they have had, and indicated what sources (e.g., media, 
jokes, etc.) have influenced their attitudes toward people with Autism or Down 
Syndrome on four items. In order to check whether our manipulation affected the 
perceived level of severity of the disability, participants rated three items assessing 
how debilitating, limiting, and severe they consider Autism or Down Syndrome to be. 
In addition to standard demographic questions, participants also reported their political 
affiliation.  
Finally, participants were fully debriefed and asked for permission to use their 
data (Appendix M; Appendix N). The experimenter emphasized the potential 
importance of humanizing people with disabilities in everyday life in order to combat 
prejudice. Before leaving, participants indicated their political affiliation and whether 
they had any close family members with either Autism or Down Syndrome.  
Results 
Five participants indicated that they had a close family member (e.g., sibling) 
with either Autism or Down Syndrome. The following analyses were conducted with 
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these participants in the sample. Results do not differ when these participants are 
excluded from analyses.  
Descriptive statistics (e.g., means, standard deviations, reliabilities, and 
correlations) for each of the scales completed in this study are provided in Table 9. As 
in Studies 1 and 2, as dehumanization increased, prejudice toward people with Autism 
and Down Syndrome increased, r(156) = .45, p < .05. In addition, the greater the 
dehumanization and the greater the prejudice, the less support for social policies 
benefitting people with disabilities was reported, rs(156) = -.38 and -.45, respectively, 
ps < .05. As anticipated, greater prejudice was associated with less positive evaluations 
of people with developmental disabilities on the semantic differential scale, r(156) = -
.36, p < .05.  
A 3 frame (Neutral, Individuated, vs. Humanized) X 2 group (Autism vs. Down 
Syndrome) ANOVA on dehumanization yielded a main effect of frame condition, F(2, 
149) = 10.96, p < .001 η2p = .13.3 As expected, reading the humanized description of 
“Tim” led participants to report less dehumanization of people with disabilities (M = 
3.43, SD = .56) than participants in the neutral description condition (M = 3.97, SD = 
.64), t(100) = 4.49, p < .001, d = .90. In addition, participants reported less 
dehumanization following the individuated (M = 3.62, SD = .61) than the neutral 
description, t(102) = 2.83, p < .007, d = .56. The humanized and individuated frame 
conditions did not differ significantly, p > .10. These findings support our expectation 
that both individuation and humanization may be effective strategies for reducing 
dehumanization. There was also a marginal effect of group condition, F(1, 149) = 3.71, 
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p = .06, η2p = .02. People reported slightly higher dehumanization of people with 
Autism (M =3.58, SD = .67) than of people with Down Syndrome (M =3.58, SD = .64).  
A 3 frame (Neutral, Individuated, vs. Humanized) X 2 group (Autism vs. Down 
Syndrome) ANOVA on prejudice revealed a main effect of frame condition, F(2, 149) 
= 5.73, p = .004, η2p= .07. People who read the neutral frame (M = 3.45, SD = .81) 
reported higher levels of prejudice toward people with disabilities than people who 
read the humanizing frame (M = 3.13, SD = .71), t(100) = 2.12, p < .04, d = .42, or the 
individuated frame (M = 2.93, SD = .80) t(102) = 3.25, p < .003, d = 65. The 
individuated frame and humanizing frame did not significantly differ from one another, 
t(102) = 1.32, p >.19. There were no other significant effects, ps > .53. 
A 3 frame (Neutral, Individuated, vs. Humanized) X 2 group (Autism vs. Down 
Syndrome) ANOVA on social policy beliefs revealed a non-significant main effect of 
frame condition, F(2, 149) = 2.24, p < .12, η2p = .03. I conducted planned comparisons 
between the individuated and neutral conditions and between the humanized and 
neutral conditions. People expressed greater support for social policies in the 
individuated frame condition (M = 5.57, SD = .48) than in the neutral condition (M = 
5.29, SD = .85), t(78) = 2.08, p < .05, d = .41. (Note that Levene’s test indicated 
unequal variances, F = 7.58, p < .008, so degrees of freedom were adjusted from 102 to 
78). However the expected difference between the neutral and humanizing (M = 5.43, 
SD = .69) conditions was not significant, t(96) = -.93, p > .35. (Levene’s test indicated 
unequal variances, so degrees of freedom for this test were adjusted from 100 to 96.) 
Due to links between social dominance orientation and support for social 
policies in previous research, I re-analyzed social policy beliefs using a 3 frame 
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condition x 2 group condition ANCOVA with social dominance orientation as a 
covariate. Social dominance orientation was a significant covariate, F(1, 148) = 44.99, 
p < .001, η2p = .23, with higher levels of social dominance orientation associated with 
decreased support for social policies benefitting people with Autism and Down 
Syndrome. With SDO in the model, the main effect for framing condition was 
significant, F(2, 148) = 5.16, p < .008, η2p = .07. Participants who read the individuated 
description (M = 5.64, SD = .48) reported greater support for social policies than those 
who read the neutral frame, (M = 5.26, SD = .85), t(102) = 2.82, p < .01, d = .55. 
Unexpectedly, people who read the individuated description also reported significantly 
greater support for social policies than those who read the humanized descriptions (M = 
5.40, SD = .69), t(102) = 2.07, p < .05, d = .40. However, the humanized condition did 
not differ from the neutral condition, t(100) = .91, p > .36, d = .18. 
The 3 frame (Neutral, Individuated, vs. Humanized) X 2 group (Autism vs. 
Down Syndrome) ANOVA on the index of petition support showed no significant 
effects (ps > .25). An ANCOVA on petition support examining SDO as a covariate 
revealed no significant effects (ps > .22). Although I expected that reading the 
humanized frame would increase favorability toward the petition (relative to the neutral 
condition), there were no significant differences between conditions.  
Next, I examined whether support for the petition was related to political 
affiliation. The majority of participants indicated that they were affiliated with the 
Democratic (n = 56) or Republican (n = 53) political parties, with the remainder of 
participants selecting Libertarian (n = 17), Tea Party (n = 1), or Other (n = 28). 
Democrats reported marginally greater support for the petition (M = 3.22, SD = 1.85) 
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than Republicans (M = 2.63, SD = 1.49), t(104.37) = 1.84, p < .07. Levene’s test for 
equality of variances was significant, F = 5.42, p < .03, indicating unequal variances. 
The degrees of freedom were adjusted from 107 to 104.37. Democrats were also 
significantly more likely to sign the petition than Republicans, χ2 (1) = 4.01, p < .05. 
Mediation Analysis 
 The effect of the interventions on social policy through dehumanization and 
prejudice was tested using a multiple serial mediation analysis. If prejudice toward 
people with developmental disabilities is hostile and rooted in dehumanization, then 
the interventions ought to increase support for social policies through reduced 
dehumanization and reduced prejudice. In Study 3, both individuation and 
humanization interventions significantly reduced dehumanization and prejudice 
relative to the neutral condition. Thus, I collapsed across treatment condition to 
examine the effects of the interventions compared to the control on social policy 
beliefs.  
 Specifically, I conducted a mediation analysis to examine the effect of the 
manipulation (0 = neutral, 1 = individuated/humanized) on social policy through 
dehumanization and prejudice (PROCESS model 6, Hayes, 2013). The indirect effect 
was significant, CI [.02, .18]. As anticipated, the relationship between framing 
condition and social policy support was mediated by dehumanization and prejudice 
(Figure 9). The individuation and humanizing fames were associated with significantly 
less dehumanization. Dehumanization was associated with greater prejudice, which in 
turn predicted decreased support for social policies. This suggests that the individuated 
and humanized frames increased participants’ support for social policies by reducing 
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dehumanization of people with developmental disabilities and prejudice toward people 
with developmental disabilities.  
Discussion 
This study demonstrated the effectiveness of both individuation and 
humanization strategies at reducing bias toward people with Autism and Down 
Syndrome. Although only the humanization frame attributed theoretically humanizing 
traits to “Tim,” both the humanization frame and the individuating frame led to 
significant reductions in dehumanization and prejudice toward people with 
developmental disabilities. Even in the absence of uniquely human traits (Haslam, 
2006) or secondary emotions (Leyens et al., 2001), simply learning more about Tim’s 
personal preferences and relationships led participants to report less dehumanization of 
and prejudice toward people with either Autism or Down Syndrome. These findings 
suggest that individuation may be an effective tool for reducing bias and 
dehumanization toward people with more severe developmental limitations, who may 
be unable to effectively express to others that they possess uniquely human traits and 
emotions.  
Although only individuation led to a significant increase in support for social 
policies, serial mediation analyses demonstrated that the interventions had a 
significant, positive indirect effect on support for beneficial social policies through 
their effects on dehumanization and prejudice. There were no interactions between 
group condition and frame condition, suggesting that the effects of the interventions on 
dehumanization, prejudice, and social policy beliefs were not moderated by group 










The present research investigated the nature of prejudice toward people with 
Autism and Down Syndrome. Study 1 and Study 2 provided initial and confirmatory 
support for a hostile model of prejudice. In both studies, the hostile model of prejudice 
provided a better fit to the data than the ambivalent model of prejudice. This hostile 
model of prejudice has three primary components: beliefs that people with Autism and 
Down Syndrome may be dangerous, desire for social distance from people with Autism 
and Down Syndrome, and beliefs that people with Autism and Down Syndrome are 
dependent on assistance from others. Together, these three subcomponents of prejudice 
toward people with Autism and Down Syndrome paint a rather bleak picture. People 
with these disabilities are viewed negatively in terms of requiring assistance, being a 
risk to others, and necessitating separation from the rest of society.  
This hostile form of prejudice was consistently associated with dehumanization. 
Across three studies, the greater the prejudice, the greater the dehumanization reported 
toward people with Autism and Down Syndrome. This link between prejudice toward 
people with developmental disabilities and dehumanization matters because of the 
severe consequences of dehumanization for the treatment of marginalized group 
members. Dehumanization has been linked to harsher and more punitive punishment of 
dehumanized group members (Goff et al., 2014; Bandura et al., 1975). This link 
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between bias and dehumanization may explain the extreme forms of discrimination and 
harm committed against people with developmental disabilities in the twentieth century 
(e.g., O’Brien, 1999).  
Furthermore, prejudice toward people with Autism and Down Syndrome was 
consistently associated with decreased support for social policies. Across all three 
studies, as both prejudice and dehumanization increased, support for social policies 
benefitting people with developmental disabilities decreased. Although one 
subcomponent of this bias reflects the belief that people with Autism and Down 
Syndrome need assistance, as reported prejudice increased participants reported 
decreased support for social policies providing that assistance. In fact, prejudice toward 
people with Autism and Down Syndrome significantly mediated the link between 
dehumanization and decreased support for beneficial social policies. Dehumanization 
predicted greater prejudice, which was associated with less support for social policies. 
Thus prejudice and dehumanization undermine support for the very social policies that 
can help people with developmental disabilities flourish. 
Although the present research provided consistent support for dehumanization 
as a root of bias toward people with developmental disabilities, the causal relationship 
between dehumanization and prejudice may not be unidirectional. In some 
circumstances, greater dehumanization may produce greater prejudice toward 
outgroups. Similarly, growing prejudice could promote greater dehumanization of 
others. Future research should further examine how dehumanization and prejudice feed 
into and contribute to one another.  
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Although the present research supported a hostile model of prejudice toward 
people with developmental disabilities, more ambivalent forms of prejudice toward this 
group may form under certain circumstances. Most participants in the present research 
reported having limited or no contact with people with developmental disabilities. 
Although greater contact with people with disabilities has been linked to lower levels 
of prejudice in previous research (McManus, Feyes, & Saucier, 2011), it is possible 
that closer relationships with people with developmental disabilities might lead to the 
development of more ambivalent forms of bias. Close relationships with people with 
developmental disabilities could increase people’s endorsement of benevolent biases, 
instead of truly reducing bias. Additional research is needed to investigate this 
possibility.  
This consistent link between prejudice and dehumanization points to possible 
interventions to reduce bias and increase support for policies that would provide 
protection for people with disabilities within society.  Study 3 examined the efficacy of 
two distinct interventions to reduce dehumanization of people with Autism and Down 
Syndrome. The humanization strategy portrayed a single person with a developmental 
disability as possessing theoretically humanizing traits (e.g., complex secondary 
emotions, close reciprocal social relationships, and personal goals). The second 
strategy involved merely individuating a person with a developmental disability. The 
target person was not presented as possessing theoretically humanizing traits, but as 
simply an individual with a routine, and emotions, and connections. Both strategies 
were effective for reducing dehumanization and prejudice. That is, both viewing a 
person with disabilities as possessing particular, humanizing traits, and merely viewing 
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them as an individual person led to a significant reduction in dehumanization and 
prejudice relative to a neutral condition. Furthermore, when controlling for social 
dominance orientation, individuation led to a moderate-sized boost in support for 
beneficial social policies, whereas humanization led to a smaller boost that did not 
reach statistical significance. Finally, mediation analyses demonstrated that these 
strategies (relative to a neutral condition) affected social policy support by reducing 
dehumanization, which then led to lower levels of prejudice toward people with 
developmental disabilities.  
Although the interventions were anticipated to boost participants’ support of the 
petition in favor of minimum wage protection for people with Autism and Down 
Syndrome, they had no effect even when controlling for social dominance orientation. 
One possible reason the interventions failed to boost support for social policies is that 
the index of petition support was not significantly associated with either 
dehumanization or prejudice. Thus, any changes in the variables primarily targeted by 
the intervention would not boost support for the petition. Furthermore, the petition was 
only weakly associated with social policy beliefs. This unexpectedly weak association 
may have been due to the index of petition support itself. This index included only two 
items (i.e., willingness to be contacted by the organization, willingness to volunteer 
with the organization). The third item, assessing favorable feelings toward the petition, 
was not related to the other two items and was removed from the index. Thus the 
support for petition index assessed willingness to engage in prosocial actions to benefit 
people with disabilities, as opposed to favorable feelings toward the petition and the 
policy it supported. Other factors may have played a more important role in 
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determining participants’ willingness to engage in prosocial behavior than their level of 
prejudice and social policy beliefs. 
The efficacy of both humanization and individuation for reducing 
dehumanization and prejudice have important policy implications. First, these findings 
suggest that it is important to think of and treat people with developmental disabilities 
as individuals. In addition, these findings suggest that initiatives already in place in 
industries that provide services to people with disabilities (e.g., person-first language, 
person-centered care planning) may be useful tools for reducing dehumanization and 
bias against people with developmental disabilities, at least in the specific settings 
where they receive care. Furthermore, individuation may have more practical utility as 
an intervention to reduce bias toward people with developmental disabilities. People 
with more severe communication and functional limitations due to their developmental 
disability may have difficulty displaying traits and characteristics associated with 
humanization (e.g., secondary emotions; Leyens et al., 2000). However, they are still 
unique individuals and capable of being seen as such. Thus, individuation may be an 
easier strategy to implement to reduce bias toward people with more severe limitations.  
These findings suggest that policies promoting the involvement of people with 
developmental disabilities within their local communities may help reduce 
dehumanization and prejudice. Previous research has shown that meaningful 
relationships and contact with people with intellectual disabilities is linked to lower 
levels of prejudice (McManus, Feyes, & Saucier, 2011). One way in which meaningful 
contact might reduce prejudice toward people with developmental disabilities is by 
increasing individuation. By spending time with and getting to know an individual with 
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a developmental disability, one may come to see people with disabilities as unique 
individuals. Thus, a person may see people with disabilities both as distinct individuals, 
as opposed to fungible group members, and as human beings (Bogdan & Taylor, 
1989). Future research should investigate whether meaningful contact is promoting 
individuation of people with disabilities.  
The present research has both strengths and limitations. The first two studies 
presented and assessed the validity of a novel measure of prejudice toward people with 
developmental disabilities. In Study 3, the hostile measure of prejudice was only 
moderately associated with a semantic differential scale of evaluations of people with 
developmental disabilities. Although the measure of prejudice was associated with 
dehumanization and social policy beliefs in theoretically anticipated ways, future 
research should further examine the convergent validity of the hostile measure of 
prejudice. In addition, the first two studies did not have large enough samples to fully 
test measurement invariance for prejudice toward people with Autism and prejudice 
toward Down Syndrome. Multiple groups CFA require the estimation of a larger 
number of parameters than other forms of CFA. Thus, these analyses require much 
larger samples. Future studies should examine measurement invariance of the hostile 
prejudice measure using a multiple groups CFA in a larger sample to examine whether 
the measure of prejudice performs similarly for both groups.  
Study 3 demonstrated that both individuation and humanization were effective 
strategies for reducing bias and dehumanization toward people with developmental 
disabilities. The manipulations used in this study were relatively subtle. Participants 
read a brief paragraph about a day in the life of a single person with a developmental 
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disability. Although this manipulation was successful, Study 3 was a single 
demonstration of the efficacy of these strategies for reducing dehumanization and bias. 
Additional research is needed to further determine the relative advantages and 
disadvantages of each strategy, and to further examine their efficacy as prejudice 
reduction strategies.  
Overall, the present research suggests that increasing humanization can both 
combat prejudice and potentially improve outcomes for dehumanized groups. Coupled 
with previous work showing that dehumanization uniquely predicted mistreatment of 
marginalized group members (Goff et al., 2013), this research suggests that addressing 
dehumanization in addition to prejudice is important for improving outcomes for 











1 Developmental disabilities are defined by the Developmental Disabilities 
Assistance and Bill of Rights act of 2000 as mental, physical, or a combination of 
impairments that appear before age 22, are chronic, and result in at least three of the 
following severe limitations: self-care, language, learning, self-direction, independent 
living, and economic self-sufficiency.   
2 Like prejudice, public stigma is characterized by the affective, cognitive, and 
behavioral responses that people have to a stigmatized person (for a review, see Werner 
et al., 2012).  
3 When gender was included in the model as a predictor, there were no 
significant main effects of gender or interactions with gender on dehumanization or 
prejudice. There was a significant main effect of gender on social policy beliefs, but no 
interaction. When included in the model predicting social policy support as a factor, 
gender had a significant main effect, F(1, 143) = 6.83, p < .02, η2 = .05. Women 
reported greater support of social policies (M = 5.61, SD = .55) than men (M = 5.30, 
SD = .76), t(152.9) = 2.92, p < .005. Levene’s test for equality of variances was 
significant, F = 7.59, p < .008, indicating unequal variances. The degrees of freedom 
were adjusted from 153 to 152.9. This main effect was qualified by a significant 
interaction with framing condition, F(2, 143) = 4.96, p < .01. In the neutral condition, 
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women expressed significantly more support for social policies (M = 5.79, SD = .56) 
than men (M = 5.00, SD = .87), t(48) = 3.94, p < .001. Levene’s test indicated unequal 
variances, F = 8.69, p < .006. The degrees of freedom were adjusted from 49 to 48. 
However, there were no significant gender differences in the individuated framing 
condition, t(51) = .23, p > .80, or in the humanized priming condition, t(49) = -.68, p > 
.50.   
When included in the model predicting petition support, gender had a 
significant main effect, F(1, 143) = 10.88, p < .002, η2 = .07. Women reported greater 
support of the petition (M = 3.36, SD = 1.82) than men (M = 2.52, SD = 1.49), t(123) = 
3.07, p < .004. Levene’s test suggested unequal variances, F = 4.14, p < .05. The 
degrees of freedom were adjusted from 153 to 123. This main effect is qualified by a 
significant interaction between gender and framing condition, F(2, 143) = 5.72, p < 
.005, η2 = .07. In the neutral framing condition, women reported greater support for the 
petition (M = 3.92, SD = 2.05) than men (M = 1.89, SD = 1.26), t(26) = 3.91, p < .002. 
Levene’s test suggested unequal variances, F = 13.86, p < .002, thus the degrees of 
freedom were adjusted from 49 to 26. However, men and women did not differ in their 
support of the petition in either the individuated condition, t(51) = .47, p > .63, or the 
humanized condition, t(49) = .69, p > .49.  There were no other significant main effects 
or interactions in the model for petition support when gender was included. 
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Appendix A: Tables 
 
Table 1 
Study 1: Descriptive Statistics for Indicators on the Prejudice Toward People With 
Developmental Disabilities Scale in Study 1 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Subscale M SD Range Skew Kurtosis 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Harm   
 1. Harm Others 3.59 1.54 1-7 .175 -.44 
 2. Aggressive 3.90 1.52 1-7 -.07 -.68 
 3. Impulsive 3.79 1.51 1-7 .00 -.50 
 4. Moral Control 3.72 1.45 1-7 .01 -.43 
 
Separate 
 5. Comfortable (R)  5.17 1.69 1-7 -.53 -.85 
 6. Welcome (R)* 6.09 1.14 1-7 -1.41 2.00 
 7. Same Class 3.16 1.75 1-7 .36 -.89 
 8. Housing 3.31 1.55 1-7 .20 -.67 
 9. Spend Time  3.10 1.58 1-7 .47 -.44 
 
Dependent 
 10. Caretakers 4.15 1.47 1-7 -.21 -.41 
 11. Easily Exploited 4.50 1.37 1-7 -.10 -.29 
 12. Childlike 4.21 1.49 1-7 -.25 -.34 
______________________________________________________________________ 




Subscale M SD Range Skew Kurtosis 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 13. Independent lives (R) 3.22 1.54 1-7 .29 -.67 
 14. Accompanied 3.60 1.48 1-7 .18 -.55 
 15. Unable to Care 3.32 1.47 1-7 .31 -.41 
 
Idealization 
 16. Make Sacrifices 4.27 1.47 1-7 -.35 -.29 
 17. Heroes  4.59 1.44 1-7 -.31 -.34 
 18. Sweeter 4.11 1.37 1-7 -.06 -.32 
 19. Inspirational 5.07 1.42 1-7 -.40 -.32 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Note. N = 196. 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Study 1 Model Fit Statistics 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
Model 2 df p CFI TLI RMSEA SRMR AIC 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
1. Ambivalent Model 171.57 113 .000 .95 .94 .052 .060 10691.72 
2. Hostile Model 91.23 63 .01 .97 .97 .048 .037 8124.60 
3. MIMIC model with   
 correlated disturbances 122.76 75 .000 .96 .95 .057 .046 8401.84 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 






Study 1 Descriptive Statistics 
________________________________________________________________ 
 Measure M SD 1  2 3 
________________________________________________________________ 
1. Dehumanization 3.76 .65 .83 .55** -.46** 
2. Prejudice 3.66 1.00  .89 -.50** 
3. Social Policy Beliefs 5.36 .86   .85  
________________________________________________________________ 
Note. N = 196. Values in diagonal represent scale reliabilities.  




Study 2: Descriptive Statistics for Indicators on the Prejudice Toward People With 
Developmental Disabilities Scale 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Subscale M SD Range Skew Kurtosis 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Harm   
 1. Harm Others 2.72 1.50 1-7 .73 -.06 
 2. Aggressive 3.73 1.61 1-7 .05 -.67 
 3. Impulsive 3.88 1.56 1-7 -.13 -.60 
 4. Harmless (R) 3.26 1.45 1-7 .36 -.30 
 5. Appropriate (R) 3.95 1.32 1-7 .15 .13 
 
Separate 
 6. Same Class 4.00 1.65 1-7 .09 -.83 
 7. Housing 2.89 1.75 1-7 .62 -.52 
 8. Spend Time  2.86 1.69 1-7 .76 -.09 
 9. Not Interact 2.64 1.76 1-7 .89 -.21 
 10 Uncomfortable 2.98 1.83 1-7 .54 -.84 
 
Dependent 
 11. Independent lives (R) 3.12 1.54 1-7 .35 -.54 
 12. Need Care 4.68 1.53 1-7 -.32 -.56 
 13. Exploited* removed 5.11 1.30 1-7 -.50 .34 
______________________________________________________________________ 




Subscale M SD Range Skew Kurtosis 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 14. Protect 5.04 1.36 1-7 -.43 -.21 
 15. Decisions 3.78 1.52 1-7 .03 -.51 
 
Idealization 
 16. Heroes 3.70 1.68 1-7 .07 -.60 
 17. Hardships*removed 5.57 1.23 1-7 -.92 1.20 
 18. Sweeter 4.14 1.57 1-7 -.23 -.34 
 19. Inspirational 4.65 1.66 1-7 -.55 -.40 
______________________________________________________________________ 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Study 2 Model Fit Statistics 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
Model 2 df p CFI TLI RMSEA SRMR AIC 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
1. Ambivalent Prej.* 472.82 114 .000 .82 .78 .10 .09 17711.08 
2. Hostile Prej. 304.35 74 .000 .84 .81 .10 .07 14587.80 
3. Hostile Prej with   
 correlated disturbances 189.65 72 .000 .92 .90 .07 .05 14477.10 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 






Study 2 Descriptive Statistics 
________________________________________________________________ 
 Measure M SD 1  2 3 
________________________________________________________________ 
1. Dehumanization 3.76 .81 .88 .60** -.36** 
2. Prejudice 3.54 .94  .86 -.59** 
3. Social Policy Beliefs 5.56 .92   .85  
________________________________________________________________ 
Note. N = 296. Values in diagonal represent scale reliabilities.  















Study 3 Descriptive Statistics, Reliabilities, and Correlations for all Scales 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
Index Means SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
1. SDO 2.68 .92 .89 -.29 .14 .18 -.47 -.04 
2. Semantic Dif. 4.69 .95  .87 -.39 -.36 .40  .23 
3. Dehumanization 3.65 .63   .86 .45 -.38 -.16 
4. Prejudice 3.32 .75    .78 -.45 -.11 
5. Social Policy 5.28 .66     .75 .16 
6. Petition 2.88 1.68      .74 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. N =156. Values on the diagonal represent scale reliabilities.  
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